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Emerging cyber-physical systems incorporate systems of systems that have 
functional interdependencies. With the increase in complexity of the cyber-
physical systems, the attack surface also expands, making cyber-physical 
systems more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The functional interdependencies 
exacerbate the security risk as a cyber-attack that compromises one 
constituent system of a cyber-physical system can disseminate to others. 
This can result in a cascade effect that can impair the operability of the whole 
cyber-physical system. In this article, we present a novel security 
architecture that localizes the cyber-attack in a timely manner, and 
simultaneously recovers the affected cyber-physical system functionality. 
We have evaluated the performance of the architecture for advanced 
metering infrastructure-based pricing cyber-attacks scenario. The 
simulation results exhibit the effectiveness of the proposed architecture in 
containing the attack in terms of system availability and its impact on the 
electric load distribution in the power grid.  
The increase in popularity of automated systems has made cyber-physical systems (CPSs) 
find their application in many diverse domains, including electrical power grid, automotive 
systems, smarthome systems and healthcare systems. Emerging CPSs integrate 
heterogeneous systems that have functional interdependencies. These integrated 
heterogeneous systems effectuate discrete functions and collaborate in an intricate fashion 
to perform the overall functionality of the CPSs.1 Modern CPSs are connected to the 
internet and employ cloud-based infrastructure for their computational requirements. 
Moreover, the systems of a CPS systematically communicate with each other and the field 
devices of a CPS are commonly provided with one or more interfaces for maintenance 
purposes.2 Nowadays, CPSs are capable of performing multiple diverse functions as 
compared to the legacy systems. However, such capability can result in an increased system 
complexity. From the systems engineering perspective, the increase in system complexity 
makes it more challenging to provide service guarantees. Similarly, from the security 
perspective, added complexity widens the attack surface.3 The functional 
interdependencies among the systems of CPS further exacerbates the security risk. An 
attack that is initiated at one sub-system of a CPS can disseminate to others. This can result 
in a cascade effect of compromising one system after other and eventually impairing the 
functionality of whole CPS in a short amount of time. 
Some CPS security frameworks mitigate the security risk by promptly patching the system 
components for newly discovered vulnerabilities, in addition to implementation of strict 
authentication protocols for communication with the CPS.4 This solution based on the 
target hardening concept is proving to be less effective as cyber-attack incidents reported 
over the years indicate a continuous increase in their sophistication. Another solution is 
based on the intrusion prevention approach, in which the security framework employs an 
intrusion detection system (IDS) that generates alerts when it identifies an anomaly in the 
working of CPS components. On the other hand, intrusion prevention systems (IPSs), in 
addition to detection, can deploy some countermeasures, such as disconnecting the 
attacker’s communication with the CPS, and halting the operation of affected CPS 
components.5  
The performance of IPSs is tightly coupled with the IDS efficiency. IDS is usually 
evaluated in terms of false positive rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR) and detection 
delay time. High FPR indicates significant number of false alarms that can make the 
behavior of the IPS unpredictable while high FNR implies an ineffective IPS. Detection 
delay time is often meted with less importance in evaluating the performance of an IDS, 
but it has a significant effect on the operations performed by the IPS. Considering a 
scenario in which the intent of the attacker is to compromise as many components of the 
CPS as possible. The attacker orchestrate the attack by systematically compromising one 
component after the other. The average time taken by the attacker to compromise a 
component and move to compromise the next one corresponds to the attack propagation 
speed. On the other hand, the average time taken by the IDS to identify if a component has 
been compromised corresponds to the detection speed. If the attack propagation speed is 
more than the detection speed then the attacker can continue to compromise the CPS 
components while the IPS would try to catch-up until all of the target components are 
compromised. This “catch-up” process is evident when the strategy of the attacker is to 
outpace the response or defense mechanism of the system rather than evade detection.     
 
The contribution of our work is multifold. First, we present an integrated security 
architecture that combines the concepts of intrusion prevention and recovery to manage 
cyber-attacks while maintaining high operational availability of CPS. Second, we propose 
a novel multi-level partitioning mechanism that partitions the CPS components based on 
their functionality and damage containment requirements. The partitions help to contain 
the damage by localizing the cyber-attack in the region of its inception. The response 
mechanism of the architecture effectively utilizes the partitions to counter attacks involving 
high attack propagation speeds as well. Finally, we have simulated advanced metering 
infrastructure (AMI)-based pricing cyber-attacks scenario, and demonstrate the 
performance of the proposed architecture in terms of operational availability (ω), damage 
extent (δ) and average energy load (AEL) consumption.   
An Integrated CPS Security Architecture 
The proposed security architecture and its interaction with a general CPS framework is 
depicted in Figure 1. The architecture has four constituent systems: partition manager 
(PAM), intrusion response system (IRES), intrusion recovery system (IREC) and 
performance monitor (PEM). The architecture utilizes the service of an intrusion detection 
system (IDS) that generates alerts upon detection of a cyber-attack. The architecture also 
uses the operational logs of CPS and assumes that they are updated in realtime with CPS 
component activities such as data flow between components with timestamp. We discuss 
the constituent systems of the architecture and their internal modules in detail starting with 
a discussion on the intrusion detection process. 
Intrusion Detection System 
Several intrusion detection techniques corresponding to different threat models exist in 
literature. IDSs employ diverse methods to identify the anomalies in the operations of the 
systems they are designed to protect. An IDS performs two major operations: collection of 
data and analysis of the data to detect malicious activities. CPS centric IDSs collect data 
by monitoring component activities or by observing CPS network traffic. The detection 
techniques are either signature-based or behavior-based. In signature-based approach the 
IDS looks for malicious pattern to make detections. In behavior-based approach the IDS 
compares every new observation with normal system behavior it has learnt during the data 
collection phase.6  Some IDSs also provide limited IPS capabilities e.g. snort7 combined 
with firewall configuration feature can filter any malicious stream from a link. This 
technique of filtering out malicious traffic refers to as negative filtering. It is also possible 
to do positive filtering in which only traffic meeting certain criteria is allowed. Firewalls 
are usually deployed on a central communication link to ensure only benign traffic flows 
through the link and it is not feasible to deploy them on every communication link of the 
system. For our proposed architecture, we assume that an IDS is available and works across 
all layers of the CPS. We assume that the IDS can report the cyber-attack type, start time 
and detection time of cyber-attack, and compromised components of CPS. We also assume 
that the firewalls can be deployed on certain communication links of the CPS. 
Figure 1. Proposed CPS security architecture and its operations across all CPS layers. 
Partition Manager 
PAM creates two levels of partitions for the CPS. The first level of partitioning involves 
demarcation of intrusion boundaries (IBs). The objective of the IBs is to contain damage 
propagation across IBs. The second level of partitioning involves the formation of 
protection-zones. The objective of protection-zones is that within an IB, components 
affected by the attack needs to be isolated quickly so that the impact of the attack is 
confined to affected components only. 
Intrusion Boundary Demarcation  
The CPS components that collaborate to provide a specific CPS function are included in 
the same IB. It is possible that a CPS component handles multiple functions while the same 
CPS component is shared among multiples IBs. An IB can encompass more than one 
functions as well. To create IBs, CPS topological structure and CPS component to 
functionality mapping is used, and are assumed to be available to the architecture. Figure 
2(a) shows advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) architecture and Figure 2(b) shows the 
division of AMI components in different IBs. The smart meters that are connected to the 
same data concentrator perform meter_ops_nan function, and form a neighborhood area 
network (NAN). Therefore, they are part of the same IB. Similarly, the AMI components 
at the enterprise system layer such as meter data management system (MDMS), consumer 
information system (CIS), outage management system (OMS), distribution management 
system (DMS) and geographic information system (GIS) are mapped to 
global_meter_management function, and can be placed in the same IB. The idea behind 
IBs is that an attack inside an IB is fully contained in it by design. The communication 
among different IBs is carried out by dedicated links or in some cases through shared 
components. The inter-IB communication can be ensured to be not malicious by applying 
a positive firewall filter policy on the inter-IB communication links or on the outgoing 
traffic from the shared component. To minimize the firewall deployment overhead, the 
number of inter-IB communication links should be minimum. To find an optimal IB 
configuration, an optimization problem similar to classical graph partitioning problem8 can 
be formulated that minimizes the edge cut among IBs. 
Protection-zone Formation 
IBs can contain thousands of CPS components and an attack starting from a single 
component in an IB can potentially compromise all of the components in that IB due to 
functional dependencies. Figure 2(c) shows an example AMI topology enclosed in an IB. 
In order to contain the damage within an IB, we introduce a second level of partitions 
known as protection-zones. The PAM groups CPS components of an IB in almost fixed-
size protection-zones such that the chances of inter protection-zone damage propagation 
are minimized. The response system of the architecture utilizes the protection-zone 
information to effectively localize the damage in an IB. The protection-zone creation 
process is formulated as a single-objective multiple constraints optimization problem with 
the goal to minimize the inter protection-zone communication. 
The CPS components in an IB and the interconnections among them can be modeled as 
an unweighted non-directional graph 𝑃, as shown in Figure 2(c). Let 𝑃 = {𝑉, 𝐸} where 𝑉 
is the set of vertices modeling CPS components and 𝐸 is the set of edges modeling the 
communication links between CPS components. Let 𝑃𝑖 be the ith subgraph, such that 𝑃 =
 ⋃ 𝑃𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1  and 𝑃𝑖 ∩ 𝑃𝑗 = ∅. For each 𝑣 ∈  𝑃𝑖, let 𝑄𝑖 = {𝑃𝑗  | ∃ 𝑒(𝑣, 𝑢) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢 ∈ 𝑃𝑗  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑗 ≠
1} i.e. 𝑄𝑖 is the set of neighboring subgraphs that contain a vertex 𝑢 that is adjacent to 𝑣 ∈
𝑃𝑖 whereas there exist an edge 𝑒(𝑣, 𝑢) between 𝑢 and 𝑣. The problem is to partition the 
graph 𝑃 into 𝑘 balanced subgraphs with minimum edge cut such that a vertex at the 
boundary of a subgraph is at most connected 1 + 𝜂 other subgraphs. Let ⊗𝑖𝑗 =
{𝑒(𝑣𝑖, 𝑣𝑗)|𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝑃𝑙  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑗 ∈ 𝑃𝑘, ∀𝑘 ≠ 𝑙}, i.e. ⊗𝑖𝑗 is the set of edges extending from one 
subgraph to another. The optimization problem is as follows. 
                                                                     min ∑ |⊗𝑖𝑗|
𝑖≠𝑗
                                         (1) 
                                            𝑠. 𝑡.       |𝑃𝑖| ≤ (1 + 𝜀)
|𝑉|
𝑘
, ∀𝑖                                 (2) 
                                                                     |𝑄𝑖| ≤ (1 + 𝜂), ∀𝑖                                      (3) 
The objective function minimizes the number of communication links between two 
different subgraphs or protection-zones. The damage propagates through the 
communication links between CPS components, therefore minimizing the communication 
across protection-zones reduces the chances of inter protection-zone damage propagation. 
Moreover, the Constraint (2) balances the sizes of the partitions as small sized partitions 
are unable to restrict the damage spread in one protection-zone and large sized partitions 
allow damage to propagate to a large number CPS components without any hindrance. 
Constraint (3) ensures that a CPS component in a protection-zone is at most connected to 
components in 1 + 𝜂 protection-zones. The intuition is that, if a component that is 
connected to components in many different protection-zones is attacked then damage could 
quickly propagate to other protection-zones. The parameters 𝜀 and 𝜂 are used to relax the 
constraints, the lower values of these parameters the better expected performance in terms 
damage containment, but usually if the constraints are too tight then there might not be a 
feasible solution for a given CPS topological structure. This graph decomposition problem 
is similar to the classical uniform graph partitioning problem8 and the PAM employs a 
greedy algorithm to create protection-zones (partitions) of similar sizes. 
PAM maintains information about the respective member components of protection-
zones and the boundary components of all protection-zones. A CPS component that has 
connections to components in other protection-zones is a boundary component. Figure 2(d) 
shows the creation of protection-zones within an IB for AMI as an example CPS. 
Intrusion Response System 
IRES is activated by the IDS upon detection of an intrusion. IRES generates response for 
the cyber-attack by utilizing the information provided by the IDS, PAM and operational 
logs of CPS. The functionality of IRES is described as follows. 
 
Damage Assessment (DA). The DA module uses the protection-zone information provided 
by PAM to identify the protection-zones where damage has been spread. PAM shares two 
data structures with the DA module. The first one maps every CPS component to a 
protection-zone and is named pz_component_list. The second data structure contains 
information about the boundary components of the protection-zones and is named 
pz_boundary_set. The IDS detects intrusions in the CPS and generates alerts that specifies 
the CPS components that are compromised. The following pseudocode describes the 
damage assessment process.    
Input: pz_component_list, pz_boundary_set, ids_alert 
Output: response_set 
1. for each ids_alert of a corrupted CPS component 
2. use pz_component_list to find the protection-zone P to which the 
corrupted component belongs 
3. identify the boundary components of P using pz_boundary_set 
4. include the identified boundary components in response_set 
   For each alert received by the DA module, response_set is computed. The components 
that need to be isolated from the rest of CPS are in the response_set. It is possible that by 
the time IDS detects an intrusion the damage has already spread to other protection-zones. 
In that case, the IDS keeps on generating alerts as more CPS components get compromised 
and the DA module keeps generating response_sets and provide them to the response 
manager module until the damage is contained. 
 
 
Figure 2. Partitioning process for AMI. (a) Multi-layered system of systems AMI 
architecture. (b) Demarcation of IBs on a given AMI topology. (c) AMI topological 
structure in an IB. (d) Partitioning of the AMI topological structure to form protection-
zones.   
Response Manager. Response manager coordinates the operations of DA and interfaces 
with the CPS control system. Response manager starts its operations the moment it receives 
an alert from IDS. First, the response manager halts the operation of the compromised 
components. Subsequently, it sends instructions to CPS control system to disconnect the 
CPS components identified in response_set. The goal here is to stop inter protection-zone 
damage propagation. This action might temporarily halt certain CPS functions, resulting in 
short-lived unavailability of those functions in exchange for the benefit of damage 
containment. Response manager continues this process until there are no more alerts from 
the IDS, indicating the damage has been successfully contained. Subsequently, the 
response manager activates IREC to start the recovery process. Additionally, response 
manager sends IRES operational information to PEM. 
Intrusion Recovery System 
IREC recovers the system in an automated fashion by determining the exact extent of 
damage, and performing corrective actions accordingly. The architecture responds first and 
recovers afterwards, because the recovery is a time consuming process while response can 
be deployed quickly after the detection of the cyber-attack. We explain the functions of 
several IREC modules briefly. 
 
Recovery Analysis (RA). RA module assesses the extent of damage by precisely identifying 
the compromised components of CPS. For an IDS alert, the recovery process is initiated 
after completion of the response process. RA module analyzes operational logs of the CPS 
that contains detailed information about the activities of CPS components. The activity of 
interest is usually the data flow information between CPS components. RA module uses 
the IDS alert information to find the start time of the cyber-attack (Ts) and the compromised 
CPS component. RA module then starts analyzing the CPS operational log to identify all 
of the components to which the compromised component communicated and includes them 
in a data structure known as repair_set. The RA process is described in the following 
pseudocode. 
Input: ids_alert, op_log 
Output: repair_set 
1. for each ids_alert of corrupted CPS component 
2.   include compromised component in repair_set 
3. for each new entry s in repair_set 
4.   identify components r in op_log that communicated with  s after Ts 
5.   include component c ∈ r in repair_set, if c ∉ repair_set 
 
It can be observed in the pseudocode that the RA module generates the repair_set by 
building causality relationship between components using inter-component 
communication information.      
 
Recovery Protocol Knowledgebase (RPK). Once the RA module identifies the compromised 
components, the RPK module determines the recovery protocol to recover them. RPK 
module maintains a knowledgebase that provides procedures that needs to be followed to 
recover the compromised CPS components. For example, if the data management server is 
compromised then the recovery techniques mentioned in9 can be employed. Similarly, if a 
field device is compromised then a redundant device could be activated, if available. 
Otherwise, if the device was providing essential data to a controller then instructions can 
be given to the controller to use simulated data till the device is restored manually. 
 
Recovery Manager. Similar to response manager, the recovery manager interfaces with CPS 
control system. Recovery manager directs recovery instructions to the CPS controllers to 
take corrective actions based on the information provided by the RPK module, for a 
particular attack. Notice that recovery manager might not be able to completely recover the 
CPS functionality in an automated manner due limitations of the CPS infrastructure or 
unavailability of appropriate recovery protocol in RPK for a particular component. In that 
case, the recovery manager only disables the corrupted component, and generates an alert 
to recover the system manually. Once the recovery process of the system is complete, the 
normal communication of all the CPS components is restored. Recovery manager also 
records the activities of IREC and forwards this information to PEM. 
Performance Monitor 
PEM provides an overview of response and recovery system performance by collecting 
statistics from IRES and IREC, and calculating different performance metrics. The 
performance monitor has two modules that we discuss briefly. 
 
Statistics Collection. Information from different systems of the proposed security 
architecture is collected and analyzed by statistics collection module. The received 
information can be in the form of extensive log files, therefore this module extracts useful 
data that is used by metrics calculation module. 
 
Metrics Calculation. We introduce ω as a measure of serviceable CPS functions, and derive 
δ from ω that reflects the impairment of CPS functions caused by an attack. The metrics 
are defined as follows. 
 
 Operational availability (ω): the available CPS functionality in terms of percentage 
of components unaffected in an attack for a CPS function. 
 Damage extent (δ): the compromised CPS functionality in terms of percentage of 
components damaged in an attack for a CPS function.   
 
Note that these metrics concern a particular CPS function. The overall CPS availability and 
damage extent can be found out by averaging the metric for all CPS functions. Also note 
that we can compute one metric from the other by subtracting the known metric value from 
100. 
Simulations and Evaluation 
We have used AMI as the target CPS application to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed security architecture. We first discuss the threat model concerning AMI followed 
by a discussion on the simulation tool and implementation of proposed architecture. 
Finally, we present our experimental setup and compare the performance of the proposed 
architecture with the commonly adapted intrusion prevention approach. 
Threat Model and Implementation 
We have employed the electricity pricing manipulation cyber-attacks on AMI10 as the 
attack scenario in our experiments. The attacker tries to exploit access vulnerabilities of 
smart meters through a direct physical link or through the AMI. The objective of the 
attacker in electricity pricing manipulation cyber-attack is to disrupt the distribution system 
of the power grid such that electricity supply to the targeted regions is suspended. The 
attacker maliciously gains access to a smart meter and usually injects a malware that could 
be propagated through the network. In AMI, smart meters are connected to the data 
concentrator through a mesh network that forms a neighborhood area network (NAN). The 
target of the malware is the guideline price information that is used by the smart controller 
to manage the usage of different appliances to reduce the electricity bill. The smart 
controller when observes a lower price at a certain time of the day, schedules the usage of 
many appliances, resulting in the increase in energy consumption of that particular 
consumer. The consumers in a NAN are usually connected to the same bus used by the 
distribution system of the power grid. If the attacker succeeds to manipulate the pricing 
information in a large number of smart meters one after the other, the transmission line that 
delivers power to the bus can trip. This can cause the transmission system to reallocate the 
power distribution to other transmission lines connecting the bus, which in turn can trip 
due to excessive load. This results in a cascading failure and the community connected to 
the bus can be out of power. This disruption in the distribution system generally doesn’t 
stay within a community as from the generation system to the consumers, power flows 
through transmission lines linked to several buses as a result a total blackout can occur. 
In order to simulate this scenario we have used SecAMI11, an opensource simulator 
developed to study the impact of cyber-attacks on AMI. SecAMI can be used to perform 
two operations: first an AMI topology involving smart meters and data concentrators can 
be created as an undirected graph, second an attack on the created topology can be 
simulated that compromises one node (smart meter) after the other according to three 
simulation parameters – compromise time of a node (ct), hop time from one node to another 
(ht), and detection time of a compromised node (dt). These parameters determine the attack 
propagation speed with respect to the detection speed in the simulation. We have modified 
the SecAMI to implement the protection-zone aware response mechanism of the 
architecture. To create protection-zones (partitions) for a given AMI topology (undirected 
graph), we have built a partitioning module on top of SecAMI that takes a parameter k and 
a topology graph as inputs to create k protection-zones of equal sizes. The partitioning 
module maintains information about the members of a protection-zone and boundary 
components of the created protection-zones. SecAMI uses a general response mechanism 
in which as a node is detected to be compromised, it is disconnected from the rest of the 
network. The proposed security architecture’s response mechanism uses the protection-
zone information to identify the protection-zones whose member nodes are detected to be 
compromised. Subsequently, it immediately halts the communication of the boundary 
nodes of the under attack protection-zones from the rest of the AMI topology. 
Experimentation and Results 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed security architecture in terms of damage 
containment, we have conducted several experiments. The variable parameters in the 
experiments are: the size of the topology in terms of number of nodes (n), the compromise 
to detection time ratio (σ = ct/dt) that specifies the attack propagation speed with respect 
to detection speed, and the partitioning parameter (k) that specifies the number of 
protection-zones for a given topology. The performance of the proposed architecture is 
measured in terms of three metrics. The first two are aforementioned general CPS damage 
containment evaluation metrics i.e. ω and δ. The third metric is AEL that is specific to AMI 
and power grid analysis. In our experiments, we consider attacks on function 1: 
meter_ops_nan1 i.e. in intrusion boundary 1 in Figure 2(b). Since only one function is 
considered, ω is the percentage of components unaffected in the attack and δ is the 
percentage of components compromised in the attack. For AEL we assume that each smart 
meter in the topology is connected to a medium-sized household with standard appliances 
like washing machine, dish washer etc. The smart controller of each consumer schedules 
the energy consumption for next 24h based on the guideline pricing information. The 
quadratic pricing model presented in12 is employed to form the normal guideline price and 
energy consumption for a general household. 
The value of ω for different values of n with σ = 3 and k = 0, 8 is shown in Figure 3(a). 
It can be seen that the performance of the proposed partition-driven architecture (k=8) is 
considerably higher as compared to the non-partitioned system (k=0) e.g. at n=200, the 
value of ω is 84.5 for the partitioned system while its value is 7.4 for the non-partitioned 
system. Moreover, note that the value of ω increases as the value of n increases until 200 
nodes after that it decreases. This is due to the fact that there exists an optimal protection-
zone size that maximizes the benefit. If the size of the protection-zone is too small, it is 
more likely that damage will propagate to other protection-zones. If the size is too big then 
many member nodes of the protection-zone can get corrupted without any hindrance. 
Figure 3(b) shows the values of δ for 200 node topology for different σ and k values. Notice 
that even when the attack propagation speed is high i.e. lower values of σ, the partitioned 
system (k>0) can effectively contain damage relative to non-partitioned system (k=0). For 
higher σ values, there is ample time for the response mechanism to react and hence the 
performance of the partition-driven architecture is significantly better. Figure 3(c) shows 
the manipulated guideline price values in a smart meter10. This change in guideline price 
increases the energy consumption of a consumer by 1.3 kWh on average in our simulations. 
Figure 3(d) shows the increase in overall demand by all the customers corresponding to 
200 node topology for non-partitioned (k=0) and partitioned systems (k=8). It can be noted 
that the partition-driven architecture efficiently handles the attack and correspondingly the 
load on the transmission lines connected to the bus connecting 200 consumers is not 
drastically increased in comparison to the non-partitioned system. 
 
Figure 3. Proposed partition-driven security architecture performance. (a) Operational 
availability over topology size for σ = 3. (b) Damage extent over number of protection-
zones for n = 200. (c) Guideline electricity price in pricing manipulation cyber-attack. (d) 
Overall AEL consumption of a community for n = 200, σ = 3.              
 
The partition-driven security architecture presented in this article proposes a 
comprehensive security solution for CPSs. The proposed architecture is able to contain the 
damage propagation and recover the CPS automatically. However, there are several 
challenges that must be addressed to develop a robust security solution for CPSs. These 
include dealing with the performance of IDS and evaluation of the proposed security 
architecture for more complex attacks. 
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